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A STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS IN RURAL INDIA 
 




The paper examines the impact of local institutions on development and poverty in the 
rural areas of India. Recent research on the role of institutions on the path of economic 
development indicates the importance of both “macro” and “micro” institutions including 
local institutions. The study finds a large number of both formal and informal local 
institutions in the surveyed villages, and a substantial degree of interaction of the households 
with the institutions. These include both formal institutions such as service cooperatives and 
dairy cooperatives, as well as informal institutions such as savings groups, community 
associations and labour groups. The study finds that apart from the standard factors included 
such as land, capital and labour, the presence and membership in local institutions plays a 
significant role in explaining the variation in household incomes and gain in capital assets 
over time. Savings/ micro-credit groups, and dairy cooperatives are found to be particularly 
important. Further, membership in these institutions is not found to be related to high asset 
levels or high caste – it is often inversely so. This indicates a stronger developmental role. 
Recorded opinions of the households supports the findings on the impact and beneficial role 
of local institutions. The study confirms that institutions do matter, and that local institutions 
can and do make a significant contribution in helping development in the rural areas, 




Institutions and their impact on economic development has been a subject of 
considerable interest in the recent years. It is being widely acknowledged now that apart 
from the standard factors of capital, labour and technology, institutions may matter 
substantially in determining the growth path and the outcome of development (North 1997). 
Institutions may often help in explaining why growth and development outcomes vary across 
areas, countries, and also over time. Olson and Kahkonen (2000) and Picciotto (1995) 
support the usefulness of the institutional economics approach. 
Williamson (2000) classifies the institutional environment into a “macro” and 
“micro” reality or levels. The macro level deals with the rules of the game or the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions: the informal   2
constraints – sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct, and formal rules – 
constitutions, laws, property rights, North (1991). The micro level deals with institutions of 
governance – market, quasi-market and hierarchical modes of contracting, or of managing 
transactions and seeing activities such as economic activities through. Most formal and 
informal local institutions in the rural areas of India may fall into the micro category. Gandhi 
(1998) provides a survey on institutions related to agricultural development in India. 
Households are usually embedded in the local institutional environment and they interact 
with it dynamically under the influence of prevailing social, economic and political 
structures, culture and power relations. Some institutions favour the poor while others 
discriminate against them. The success of collective action for gaining access to resources 
and markets often depends on the effectiveness of institutions in serving their constituencies. 
The decisions that households make on how to allocate resources and generate income often 
depend, not only on the household’s resources but also on the local institutional 
environment. 
This paper outlines the local institutional environment in a sample of villages in rural 
India. It examines the interaction of households with the institutions. It examines whether 
over and above the standard determinants of household welfare, local institutions could be 
making a difference in development outcomes such as income and capital asset growth. 
Conversely, it also studies whether membership in these institutions is itself restricted by 
economic and social status. Together, it then seeks to examine whether local institutions 
make a difference in the outcomes of economic development and poverty alleviation. 
Background and Data 
 
There have been very few studies which have critically examined these relationships 
at the micro level. Grootaert and Narayan (2001) have examined the relationship between   3
local institutions, poverty and household welfare in Bolivia, focusing mainly on social 
capital. They find significant returns to household investment in social capital especially for 
the poor. Donnelly-Roark, Ouedraogo and Ye (2001) have examined whether local 
institutions can help reduce poverty. They find that the local institutions seem to play a 
significant role. 
Bardhan (2000) and Chelliah (2000) have examined institutional impediments to 
economic development at the macro level in India. It was in mid-1991 that India had initiated 
decisive economic reforms making a break away from the strongly inward-oriented policy 
regime of the past (Ahluwalia and Little 1998). Licensing requirements were drastically 
rolled back to give private sector a free hand. The initial response to the reforms was quite 
striking and included faster growth, and better export performance. However, constraints 
particularly from institutional failures, as well as infrastructure bottlenecks and resistance 
from vested interests created many difficulties.  
The study is based on information collected in a survey on rural household income 
strategies and interactions with the local institutional environment conducted by and Indian 
Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and FAO (see Gandhi 1999). Four diverse villages 
were intensively studied through approaches of PRA, household survey and institutional 
survey in the year 1998. Two of the villages were from a semi-arid area and two from a sub-
humid area, in the state of Gujarat in western India. The household survey data were 
collected from a stratified random sample of 120 households.  35 households were sampled 
from each of the bigger villages, viz. Malan in Banaskantha district and Malawada in Kheda 
district. 25 households were sampled from each of the smaller villages, viz. Rampuravadla in 
Banaskantha district and Piparia in Kheda district.    4
Agriculture is important and highly diversified in state of Gujarat. But the state is not 
endowed with the best of agro-climatic conditions. This makes it, overall, a food-deficit state 
with several areas and populations facing food-security problems in different parts of the 
year. A significant feature of Gujarat is its large variety of institutional experiments 
including a strong co-operative movement (20 percent of the country’s non-credit co-
operatives are located in Gujarat), and a large number of NGOs and informal groups. This 
make it one of the ideal areas to study for the impact of institutions on the households and 
the relationship with income-generation, poverty and food security. 
Institutional Environment and Profile 
The institutional survey indicated that there were 38 local institutions in the 4 
villages. Table 1 shows that there were a greater number of institutions – 23, in the semi-arid 
district of Banaskantha, as compared to 15 institutions in the better endowed sub-humid 
district of Kheda. The number of institutions per village varied from 5 to 17, indicating 
considerable variation. 
Table 1 : Number of Institutions Found 










Table 2 indicates that of the 38 institutions, 23 were formal whereas 15 were 
informal. In terms of local kinds, 18 different types of institutions were identified. Some 
such as the Village Gram Panchayat and the Village Cooperative Milk Producers’ Society 
were found in all the villages, whereas others such as the Savings Group and the Labour   5
Group were not found in all of them. Others such as the oil-seeds cooperative were found 
only in one. 
Table 2: Kinds of Institutions 
Type of Institutions 
Formal 23 
Informal 15 
Locally identified kinds: 
1.   Madrasas (Muslim)  3 
2.   Village Service Co-operative Society  3 
3.   Village Co-op. Milk Producer’s Society  4 
4.   Cattle rearing group  2 
5.   Bachat Mandal (Savings group)  3 
6.   Shakti Raslila Mandal  1 
7.   Community Mandal  4 
8.   Labour groups  3 
9.   Mahila (Women) Mandal  2 
10.  Youth Mandal  4 
11.  Village Gram Panchayat  4 
12.  Tirbandha Kelavni Mandal  1 
13.  Co-op. Bank  1 
14.  Fair Price Shop  2 
15.  Nationalised Bank  1 
16.  Oil Seeds Co-op. Society  1 
17.  Community Punch  2 
18.  Kelavani Mandal  1 
Household Profile 
 
A few features of the household survey are given in the tables below. Table 3 shows 
that a substantial percentage of the population in the households surveyed were illiterate 
(45.4 percent). Table 4 shows that though the household heads had many different 
occupations, 36.7 percent were into farming and 45.0 percent were agricultural labour. This 
indicates a huge dependence on agriculture for incomes and livelihood. 
Table 3 : Literacy  of Total Population above 12 years 
(Percent)
S.No. Education  Banaskantha  Kheda  Total 
1 Illiterate  59.8  31.2  45.4 
2 Literate  40.2  68.8  54.6 
 Total 100.0  100.0  100.0   6
Table 4: Main Occupation of Head of the Household 
Occupation Percentage 
Farming 36.7 





Diamond Work  0.8 
Shopkeeper/Trader 2.5 
Hair Cutting  0.8 
Driver 2.5 
Domestic Work  0.8 
Vegetable Hawker  1.7 
 
Table 5 indicates the status on land distribution. It indicates that landless households 
form a substantial percentage (35-40 percent), and around 30 percent are marginal, having 
less than 2.5 acres of land. 
Table 6 gives some information on household membership in institutions (institutions 
1-10, Table 2). It indicates that 23.5 percent are members in at least one institution, and 19.1 
percent are members in two. 77 percent of the members are men and 23 percent are women. 
1.6 percent indicate that they are committee members. Participation in meetings appears to 
be reasonably high with only 8.7 percent not attending any meeting and 71 percent attending 
at least 1 or 2. 
Table 5 : Distribution of Households on Land Owned 
(Percentage)
Status 1990/91  1997/98 
No Land  37.5  35.8 
Marginal (>0 to 2.5 acres)  27.5  30.0 
Small (2.5 to 5.00 acres)  18.3  16.7 
Medium (5.01 to 10.00 acres)  13.4  15.0 
Large (Above 10 acres)  3.3  2.5 
All 100.0  100.0 
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Table 6 : Membership 
Description Percentage 
Membership  
1 Institution  23.50 
2 Institutions  19.10 
3 Institutions  12.00 
4 Institutions  0.50 
Membership by Gender in Institutions 
Male 77.00 
Female 23.00 
Role in Institutions 
Just a Member  98.40 
Committee Member  1.60 
Members Attending the Meetings in a Year 
Not attending at all  8.70 
1-2 meetings  71.00 
3-4 meetings  12.60 
5-6 meetings  2.20 
Many 5.50 
 
Institutions in Relation to Household Welfare 
 
Household incomes may be determined by a variety of features of the household. 
Even if one wants to find the effect of institutions on household incomes or welfare, it is 
important to build-in most of the determinants so that the impact of institutions can be 
properly assessed. In the case of rural households in India, these determinants could include 
land, capital assets (productive-other than land), labour, as well as others such as education 
and institutional membership. It is hypothesized that in the crossection, rural household 
income could be a function of the following: 
Y = f (A, K, L, E, I) 
 
Where: 
Y = Total Household Income (or other measures such as total capital asset gain over time) 
A = Land Owned (including type) 
K = Capital Assets – productive, other than land 
E = Education level 
I = Institutional membership 
   8
A major difference in the land asset in India is whether it is unirrigated or irrigated, 
because unirrigated and irrigated lands are vastly different in their productive capacity and 
technology use. They need separation. Capital other than land includes farm and livestock 
assets. Education has different levels from illiteracy to higher education. Institutions are 
represented by institutional membership and this can be in different kinds of institutions 
(though non-members can also sometimes benefit). The following 5 institutions with specific 
and appreciable membership in the sample are being included here: Village Service 
Cooperative (Farm Credit and Inputs), Village Dairy (Milk Producers’) Cooperative, Savings 
Group (Micro-credit), Village Community Association, and Labour Group. 
Based on these, the following function was defined for estimation: 
 
Yi = f ( x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10,x11) 
 
Where: 
Yi  = (1) Gross total household income, (2) Change in total household assets, (3) Change 
in non-land household assets. (Change between 1990/91 and 1997/98). 
x1  = Unirrigated land owned 
x2  = Irrigated land owned 
x3  = Total value of all farming assets other than land 
x4  = Family labour force (13-60 y) 
x5  = Education level 
x6  = District dummy 
x7  = Membership of service cooperative (mainly farm credit and inputs) 
x8  = Membership of dairy cooperative 
x9  = Membership of savings (micro-credit) group 
x10  = Membership of village community association 
x11  = Membership of labour group (labour contracts) 
  (All membership variables are coded: 1=member, 0=not a member) 
(see Appendix for details) 
 
Results on Institutions to Household Welfare Relationship 
  The results of the functions estimated through OLS regression analysis are 
given in Table 7. Estimation is done for the full sample, as well as for the sample below 
median household income – following an approach seen in Grootaert and Narayan (2001).   9
 
Table- 7  : OLS regression results on determinants of household income and asset increase 
   Independent  Variables  Eq. 
No. 
Depend. 
Var.   Constant  x1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 9 x 10 x 11 
R
2 N 
  Full Sample 
Coeff. -5606.2  486.94  10738.0 0.18004 2905.5  3968.9  1929.1  -8927.0 5198.5 26458.0  4150.3  -6926.9  0.871  120 
t-stat.  -0.660  0.239 9.862 2.146 2.353 2.846  0.292 -1.259  0.883  2.227  0.601 -0.815      1 y1 
Signf.    ***  **  **  ***      **       
Coeff.  -4132.5  1092.9 3936.6 0.97648  4391.4 6444.8  -17444 1100.3 -4460.8  22340.0 -33728.0 -11709.0 0.708 120 
t-stat.  -0.217  0.240 1.616 5.204 1.589 2.066  -1.180 0.069  -0.338  0.840  -2.184 -0.616      2 y2 
Signf.     ***   **       **       
Coeff. -3474.6  1816.1  -1130.7  0.75106 1697.0  6211.5  -3079.4 -2827.2 -5907.2 29924.0 -11925.0 -12953 0.715 120 
t-stat.  -0.337  0.735 -0.856  7.384 1.133 3.673  -0.384 -0.329 -0.827  2.077  -1.424 -1.257      3 y3 
Signf.     ***   ***      **       
  Sample below median household income 
Coeff. 5359.5  658.42  -1754.0  0.0762  1992.9 1235.0  -77.113  -3052.9  2162.6  -1694.1 2919.6  -2183.5 0.465  60 
t-stat.  1.990 0.730 -1.638  0.617 4.845 2.526  -0.038 -0.993 1.006  -0.391  1.224  -0.976      4 y1 
Signf.  **     ***  **             
Coeff. 707.46  13417.0 -2953.1  -0.1536 1554.6  6194.9  -19593.0 -25371.0 20868.0  -21368.0 -6871.5  -52.39.5 0.336  60 
t-stat.  0.053 3.003 -0.557  -0.251  0.763 2.559  -1.966 -1.666 1.960  -0.995  -0.582 0.473      5 y2 
Signf.   ***     ** *   **         
Coeff. 96.181  6831.5  -647.84  0.6523  617.17  5940.9 -14180.0 -15037.0 5854.9 -20246.0 -51.638  -5090.3  0.340  60 
t-stat.  0.010 2.154 -0.172  1.501 0.427 3.458  -2.005 -1.391 0.775  -1.340  -0.006 -0.647      6 y3 
Signf.   **     ***  **             
Note: Statistical Significance: *** Significant at 99%, **  Significant at 95%, *   Significant at 90%   10
The results of the full sample function for household income indicate that whereas 
determinants such as irrigated land, capital, labour and education are strongly associated, 
institutional variables such as savings/micro-credit group membership also show a strong 
association, indicating the importance of institutions. The capital asset gain equations also 
show strong association with capital and education but also with institutional membership 
in savings/micro-credit group. It way be mentioned that these are associations and would 
be difficult to interpret if the membership in institutions itself skewed, such as towards 
higher income groups. This pattern is checked below and not found to be of concern. 
  The equations results for the below median income group segment are also given 
in the Table. The household income equation indicates that labour force and education 
show strong associations but some institutions such as dairy cooperative and community 
association are also associated. The capital asset increase equations reveal a significant 
association with the dairy cooperative membership. These findings indicate the 
development impact of institutions in the area. The results show that institutions matter 
and some institutions matter even more for the poorer population. 
Institutional Membership and Household Charecteristics 
  A criticism sometimes reported about such analysis is that the membership in 
some institutions is itself sometimes related household economic status (e.g. better-off 
households) and in the case of India, often to the higher caste of households. Thus, the 
results could be biased. It is important, therefore, to examine the relationship of 
institutional membership to such household charecteristics. This is formulated as follows: 
Mi = f (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6) 
Where: 
Mi  = membership in institutions i (i = 1 to 5 in the same order as above), coded as 
1=member, 0=non-member   11
z1  = Unirrigated land owned 
z2  = Irrigated land owned 
z3  = Total value of all farming assets other than land 
z4  = Family labour force (13-60 y) 
z5  = Education level 
z6  = Caste (castes are coded as: 1=lower caste, 2=lower-middle caste, 3=higher caste) 
(see Appendix for details) 
 
  Since the dependant variable is binary, the function is be estimated by a Logit 
regression procedure. The results are given in Table 8. Irrigated land, which is one of the 
most valuable assets, is found to have in every case a non-significant association with 
membership. This indicates that the membership is not related to the high asset ownership 
(rich). Further, the other two major assets, unirrigated land and other capital, are non-
significant in most cases, also indicating that membership is not confined to the wealthy. 
One exceptions is service cooperative for unirrigated land, perhaps because the 
cooperative requires some land ownership, and another is the dairy cooperative for other 
farm capital, perhaps because this cooperative requires livestock ownership – which is 
included in other farm capital. However, the association with caste is negative in every 
case, and strongly negative in a few cases, indicating that caste is not a major barrier and 
is often inversely related to membership. These results indicate that institutions include 
poorer and lower caste households, often in greater number, and since they benefit them, 
they could benefit them more, indicating a stronger developmental role. 
Subjective Opinions about the Impact of Local Institutions 
  Given below in Table 9 is an analysis of the direct responses from the households 
regarding the impact of institutions in the villages. 57 percent indicate that institutions 
have a positive to highly positive impact, 43 percent indicate no impact, and none 
indicate negative impact. 70 to 90 percent indicate that there is no specific benefit to any 
religious, caste or other such group.   Benefits to upper and middle income groups is    12
 
Table- 8 : Logit regression results on determinants of institutional membership 
 Independent  Variables  Eq. 
No. 
Depend. 
Var.   
Con-
stant  z1  z2 z 3  z4 z 5 z 6 
Chi-sq N 
Coeff.    0.6072 -0.0510 0.0981 0.0297 -0.3587 -0.1366 32.9  120 
t-stat.    2.680 -0.438  1.098 0.327 -2.684 -0.586      1 m1 
Signf.    ***     ***       
Coeff.    -0.1938 0.1130 0.0900 -0.1016 -0.1203 -0.2955 58.0  120 
t-stat.    -0.957  0.632 3.711 -0.961  -0.857 -1.131      2 m2 
Signf.      ***          
Coeff.   -0.5499 -0.1047 0.0126  -0.3975 0.1692  -1.1366  10.9 120 
t-stat.    -0.803 -0.300 0.485  -1.507 0.770  -1.992      3 m3 
Signf.          **     
Coeff.    0.8275 0.01650 -0.0937 0.0652 -0.2858 -0.8139 40.5  120 
t-stat.    3.202 0.083 -0.832  0.638 -1.762 -2.521      4 m4 
Signf.    ***     *  **     
Coeff.    -0.5913 -0.5964 0.0545 0.1153 0.1736  -1.697  14.7  120 
t-stat.    -1.146 -0.883 0.163  0.850  0.994  -3.014      5 m5 
Signf.          ***     
Note: Statistical Significance: *** Significant at 99%, **  Significant at 95%, *   Significant at 90% 
 
indicated by relatively few, whereas benefit to small/marginal farmers, landless, and 
labour/ wage earners is indicated by substantial numbers. 
Table 9 : Opinion of the Households on Impact of Institutions towards the 
Economic Development of the Village  
(percent)
Impact of the Institution   
Substantially 
positive 
Positive No  impact  Negative  Substantially 
negative 
1) Village as a whole  16.20  40.50  43.20  0.00  0.00 
2) Any particular religious group   5.40  8.10  86.50  0.00  0.00 
3) Any particular caste  8.10  21.60  70.30  0.00  0.00 
4) Any other group  2.70  8.10  89.20  0.00  0.00 
5) Women  10.80  40.50  48.60  0.00  0.00 
6) Poor  8.10  51.40  40.50  0.00  0.00 
7) Middle Income  2.70  45.90  51.40  0.00  0.00 
8) Upper Income  0.00  32.40  67.60  0.00  0.00 
9) Large/medium farmers  2.70  32.40  64.90  0.00  0.00 
10) Small/marginal farmers  5.40  54.10  40.50  0.00  0.00 
11) Landless  10.80  43.20  45.90  0.00  0.00 
12) Labour/wage earners  8.10  51.40  40.50  0.00  0.00 
13) Livestock owners  8.10  40.50  51.40  0.00  0.00 
14) Tribals  0.00  29.70  70.30  0.00  0.00 
15) Scheduled Castes  2.70  59.50  37.80  0.00  0.00 
16) Youth  0.00  32.40  67.60  0.00  0.00 
   13
Conclusions 
The paper has sought to examine the impact of local institutions on development 
and poverty in the rural areas of India based on primary survey work in western India. 
Recent revival of interest in the role of institutions on the path of economic development, 
and findings on their possible significant impact seems to indicate an important role of 
both “macro” and “micro” institutions such as local institutions. 
 The study finds a substantial number of both formal and informal local 
institutions in the surveyed villages, and a substantial degree of interaction of the 
households with the institutions. These include formal and informal local institutions 
such as service cooperatives, dairy cooperatives, savings groups, community associations 
and labour groups. The study finds that apart from standard determinants of land, capital, 
labour and education, local institutions appear to play a significant role in explaining the 
variation in the household incomes, and the gain in capital assets over time. These 
include particularly the savings/ micro-credit groups, and the dairy cooperatives. Further, 
it is found that the membership in these institutions is not related to high asset levels or 
high caste – is often inversely so. This indicates a stronger developmental role. Direct 
responses of the households also supports these findings on the nature, impact and the 
beneficial role of local institutions. The findings confirm that institutions matter, and 
local institutions can and do seem to play a significant role in helping economic 
development in the rural areas, including especially for the lower income groups.   14
Appendix: Varaible-Data Notes 
Gross total family income=gross total household income from all sources (Rs.); Total 
household assets=includes all farm and household/consumer assets (Rs.); Land 
unirrigated/ irrigated (acres); Total value of all farming assets other than land=farm and 
livestock assets excluding land (Rs.); Family labour force=all family members in 13-60 
year age range; Education level=different levels from illiterate=1 to doctorate=10; 
District dummy: Banaskantha=1, Kheda=0; Institutional membership: member=1, not a 
member=0; Castes: identified, grouped and coded as: 1=lower caste, 2=lower-middle 
caste, 3=higher caste. 
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